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Background:  Emergency  department  (ED)  overcrowding  continues  to  be  a  well-publicized
problem  in  a  number  of  countries.  In British  Columbia,  a  province  in  Canada,  an  ED  pay-
for-performance  (ED  P4P)  program  was  initiated  in  2007  to  create  ﬁnancial  incentives  for
hospitals  to reduce  patients’  ED  length  of  stay  (ED LOS).  This  study’s  objectives  are  to  deter-
mine  if  the  ED  P4P  program  is associated  with  decreases  in  ED  LOS, and  to  address  the  ED
P4P program’s  limitations.
Methods: We  analyze  monthly  hospital-level  ED  LOS  time  data  since  the  inception  of the
ﬁnancial  incentives.  Since  the  ED  P4P  program  was  phased  in  at different  hospitals  from  dif-
ferent health  authorities  over  time,  hospitals’  data  from  only  two  regional  health  authorities
are included  in  the  study.
Results:  We  ﬁnd  association  between  the  implementation  of  ED  P4P  and  ED LOS  time
data.  However,  due  to the  lack of control  data,  the  ﬁndings  cannot  demonstrate  causality.
Furthermore,  our  ﬁndings  are  from  hospitals  in  the greater  Vancouver  area  only.
Interpretation:  BC’s  ED  P4P  was  introduced  to  create  incentives  for hospitals  to reduce  ED
LOS  by  providing  incremental  incentive  funding.  Available  data  indicate  that  the  ED  P4P  pro-
gram is associated  with  mixed  successes  in reducing  ED  LOS  among  participating  hospitals.
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Open access unde1. Introduction
Spending on hospitals, or lack thereof, has been blamed
for recent worsening of British Columbia’s (Canada, BC)
emergency room congestion. With a fair degree of rhetoric,
ED wait times are kept in the public’s eye; the wait times
are routinely reported in several of Canada’s provinces and
appear in the media when waits become unusually long
[1,2]. Whether right or wrong, from the public’s perspec-
tive, wait times in the ED are viewed as an important
indicator of the health of Canada’s publicly funded health
care system.
Emergency department overcrowding is not a novel
problem in hospitals around the world [3,4]. There is a
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sizable literature describing the multitude of factors that
contribute to ED wait times and lengths of stay, includ-
ing inappropriate use of EDs for non-emergent complaints,
growth in population size, and decrease in health care
resources and expenditures [5–7]. The most recent studies
demonstrate that the biggest contributor to ED length of
stay is hospital occupancy and ED inpatient boarding [8,9].
As experienced in BC, ED visit volumes and ED wait
times have been increasing in major Canadian cities in the
past decades [10]. A variety of policy options have been
implemented to respond to the issue of long wait times.
The most common response has been to add resources,
including nursing staff and physicians, and to reconﬁg-
ure the physical layout of existing EDs to include “Fast
Track” areas that are intended to support the treatment and
discharge of non-urgent patients quickly. Other responses
have included ambulance diversions and increases in inpa-
tient bed capacity to transition ill patients from the ED into
inpatient beds [11]. More recent responses have included
public reporting of wait times and ﬁnancial incentives for
reducing wait times in order to improve access [12].
In Canada, each province is responsible for organiz-
ing, delivering and funding healthcare for their residents,
resulting in Canada having ten different provincial health-
care systems. Financed through a variety of mechanisms,
each province’s hospital-based care is publicly funded.
BC is the third most populous province in Canada,
with approximately 4.4 million residents [13]. Publicly
funded healthcare in BC is organized according to ﬁve
geographically based health authorities, with one addi-
tional health authority that ensures funding for, and access
to, provincially funded health services such as chronic
kidney disease, tertiary cardiac surgery and transplant ser-
vices [14]. The regional health authorities are publicly
funded governing structures whose are responsible for the
administration and delivery of health care within their
geographically deﬁned region. They receive their fund-
ing from the provincial government. The administration
in each health authority disburses the funding to different
providers according to the priorities in their own  respec-
tive health region. Following this governance structure,
hospital funding is ﬁrst allocated from the BC provincial
governments to each regional health authority, which then
allocates funding to individual hospitals [15].
To untangle the role of funding in ED wait times in
Canada, we note that in each province, hospitals are pre-
dominantly publicly funded through global budgets, which
are “lump sums” in order to care for all patients. Fund-
ing hospitals using historically based global budgets, with
medical inﬂation annual adjustments, stands in stark con-
trast with Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, which have largely tran-
sitioned to funding inpatient care based on the hospitals’
case mix  [16,17]. Historically based global budgets have
been criticized for contributing to rationing of hospital care
and creating long wait lists [18].
The current method for funding ED activity in BC’s
hospitals is straightforward. EDs are provided annual oper-
ating budgets by their hospital administrators who “split
the pie” of the global budget of the hospital received from
the Health Authority. In the hospital’s allocation of theirth Policy 113 (2013) 86– 92 87
revenues among clinical and support departments, fund-
ing for EDs is largely based on previous years’ allocations. In
other words, the operating budget for the EDs is not funded
on a fee-for-service basis.
While the hospitals’ ED operational budgets are gen-
erally independent of the number or the acuity of patients
who present to the ED during the current ﬁscal year, hospi-
tals’ ED budget can be increased by hospital administrators
reallocating some portion of the hospitals’ global budget.
The ED budget is set at the beginning of the ﬁscal year (April
to March), though it can be modiﬁed during the subsequent
year if hospital administrators can demonstrate that the
acuity and volume of patients have increased from year to
year [14].
The ED operating budget excludes ED physician pay-
ments, which are paid to ED physicians directly from the
provincial government, bypassing the Health Authority and
hospital administration. Physicians are remunerated based
on each patient seen, or in some cases, as a salary. The latter
approach is known as an Alternative Funding Model and is
more commonly used in teaching hospitals to reﬂect the
dual expectations of an emergency physician as a clinician
and an educator.
In the 2009–2010 ﬁscal year, there were in excess of
1.9 million visits to BC’s hospitals’ EDs with the volume
of patient visits increasing approximately 4% each year
[10]. Matched with a growing public perception of long
ED waits, decreasing ED length of stay is very high on
the BC government’s policy agenda. In this gap between
global budget funding policies and lengthening wait times,
Canada’s provinces are asking whether new models of
funding, such as ED pay-for-performance (ED P4P), can
reduce ED wait times while preserving the quality of care.
The role of ﬁnancial incentives is new to Canada where
global budgets have been the dominant method of fund-
ing hospital care for decades. In the ﬁscal year 2007–2008,
BC’s Ministry of Health initiated an ED P4P program as a
pilot project to improve wait times in BC’s EDs. This pro-
gram spent in excess of $1.6 million in performance-related
funding in its ﬁrst year, an amount that has grown to $22
million in 2010 [10]. However, the potential for funding
incentives to reduce ED wait times in Canada’s healthcare
system are not well understood.
In 2010, the government of BC created the BC Health
Services Purchasing Organization (BC HSPO), an entity sep-
arate from the provincial government with a three-year
budget provided by BC’s Ministry of Health. The BC HSPO’s
responsibilities include the design, implementation and
administration of ﬁnancial incentives for BC’s healthcare
sector [19]. Since its inception, the BC HSPO subsumed the
responsibility for the administration and funding of the
ongoing ED P4P program.
Not all hospitals in BC participate in the ED P4P program,
or are eligible for the P4P funding. The administrators from
each health authority select hospitals to participate. Urban
hospitals that have the highest number of ED visits and
longest wait times are typically those that are selected to
participate.
The ﬁnancial incentives of the ED P4P program are
based on each patient whose ED length of stay (ED LOS)
time is less than the time target. Each patient’s ED LOS
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Table 1
Summary of ED P4P ﬁnancial incentives by triage score, discharge location and wait time target.
CTAS score Triage acuity Discharge from ED location ED length of stay time target Funding incentive per patient
1 Resuscitation
Discharged home Less than 4 h $100
Admitted to inpatient Less than 10 h $600
2 Emergent
Discharged home Less than 4 h $100
Admitted to inpatient Less than 10 h $600
3 Urgent
Discharged home Less than 4 h $100
Admitted to inpatient Less than 10 h $600
4 Less  urgent
Discharged home Less than 2 h $100
Admitted to inpatient Less than 10 h $600
5 Non-urgent
Discharged home Less than 2 h $100
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ime target is severity-adjusted based on the Canadian
riage Acuity Scale (CTAS) category [20,21]. The CTAS is
 validated instrument used widely in Canadian and inter-
ational EDs. ED triage nurses assign patients to one of ﬁve
TAS acuity levels, each with a recommended time to initial
hysician assessment based on the patient’s vital signs and
resenting complaint [20,21]. A summary of ED LOS time
argets, patient CTAS scores and funding incentives as per
D P4P is shown in Table 1. Notably, the ED LOS time targets
or the BC P4P program is not consistent with the Canadian
ssociation of Emergency Physician’s recommendations of
n ED LOS of less than 6 h for CTAS 1, 2 and 3 patients, and
ess than 4 h for CTAS 4 and 5 patients [22].
The ED LOS time target and per patient ﬁnancial incen-
ive for the BC P4P program were determined at the
nitiation of the program based on expert opinion. For each
on-admitted patient, the incentive amount is approxi-
ately equal to a quarter day’s salary of an ED nurse
orking in BC. For each admitted patient, the incentive
mount is approximately equal to one and a half day’s
alary of an ED nurse.
The BC HSPO determines the minimum number of visits
hat each participating hospital must attain. This ‘ﬂoor’
umber of ED visits that must occur for the hospital to
ualify for the P4P incentive funding was also set by expert
pinion, though each hospital met  the criteria each period.
Based on each period’s data regarding the number of
atients that attain the target ED length of stay times in
ach CTAS category, the BC HSPO allocates and disburses
he incremental ED P4P funding. The ﬁnancial beneﬁts
f the ED P4P program accrue to the hospital’s Health
uthority, which then directs the incentive funding to the
articipating hospitals. The ED P4P funding does not accrue
o physicians, whose incomes are not affected by the pro-
ram, and who continue to be remunerated directly by the
C government.
It is the hospital’s discretion how to allocate the ED P4P
ncremental funding; the funding can be earmarked to the
D or subsumed within the hospital’s operating budget.
hough the ED P4P program provides ﬁnancial incentives
o stimulate change in hospital’s management of ED LOS,
t does not provide direction to hospital administrators as
o how to affect the changes necessary to reduce individual
ospital’s ED LOS. Although emergency physician’s salariesLess than 10 h $600
are not affected by the P4P incentive payments, the hospi-
tal may  use the P4P incentive funding to hire additional
physicians and healthcare staff.
In the ﬁscal year 2010–2011, a total of $12.9 million
incentive-based funding was  paid by the BC HSPO to par-
ticipating Health Authorities for the ED P4P program [23].
Now that the ED P4P’s expenditures have spanned several
years, there is considerable policy interest across Cana-
dian provinces in assessing whether ﬁnancial incentives
are related to shorter length of stay in BC’s EDs. The pur-
pose of this study is to analyze whether incentive funding
for EDs are associated with shorter ED patient length of
stay.
2. Data and methods
The basis for BC’s ED P4P program is the ED LOS, which is
the time from each patient’s initial ED presentation to dis-
charge from the ED. The patient’s initial ED presentation
time is taken as the time when the patient registers and
is entered into the registration system by the registration
clerk. Patients’ discharge times are entered into the regis-
tration system by the unit clerk and/or the ED nurses, often
after the patient has already left the department. Taken
together, the presentation time and discharge time data
entered into each hospital’s computerized registration sys-
tem form the basis of the time-based incentives used by the
BC HSPO for supplemental hospital funding.
A designate, usually a nurse manager, from each of the
participating hospitals’ ED submits summaries of the time
data at the end of each reporting period to the BC HSPO.
There are 13 periods for which data is reported each ﬁscal
year. Hospitals not participating in the incentive program
do not collect ED LOS data.
In the ﬁrst three years of the ED P4P program, only
ED LOS affected incentive funding. No additional clinical
data informing ED’s quality affected the funding incentive.
However, very recently, a patient-level reporting system
for patient’s ED visits has been implemented which will
facilitate future analyses between ED LOS and clinical data.At intermittent times, BC HSPO conducts audits of the
time data submitted by hospitals. Hospitals’ ED comput-
erized tracking systems are contrasted against the data
summaries submitted to the BC HSPO. To date, there are
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no mechanisms to change submitted data from hospitals,
nor is there a policy statement or a penalty regarding the
submission of erroneous data.
Prior to joining the ED P4P program, ED wait and ED LOS
data was not routinely collected in hospitals or reported to
the BC HSPO. As a result, a pre- and post-analysis of the
effectiveness of the ED P4P incentive is not possible. The
current analysis is thus limited to examining the rate at
which ED patients meet the ED length of stay time thresh-
olds after the funding incentives had been implemented to
observe whether patients wait times are decreasing.
Health authorities’ hospitals joined the ED P4P pro-
gram at different points in time. The ED P4P program
began in 2007 with four hospitals from the Vancou-
ver Coastal Health Authority (VCHA). Four hospitals from
the Fraser Health Authority (FHA) joined the program in
September 2008. Both Vancouver Coastal and Fraser Health
Authorities encompass the most populous regions of BC,
including Vancouver, a major metropolitan city. Hospi-
tals from Vancouver Island Health Authority and Interior
Health Authority joined the program in January 2010 and
thus, are not included in the analysis since their data is
sparse and has not yet been veriﬁed.
A multivariate Poisson regression model for serially
correlated count data was used to model the number of
monthly visits that attain the P4P ﬁnancial incentive over
time, controlling for structural characteristics of the hos-
pital: the number of hospital beds, whether the hospital
is a teaching hospital, Health Authority and hospital-level
effect, which is nested within health authorities. The num-
ber of monthly visits was also included in the Poisson
regression model. While the patient characteristics of acu-
ity (CTAS level) were included in the model, additional
covariates, such as patient age, were not available for inclu-
sion in the multivariate model.
Two separate analyses were conducted, separated
according to the patients’ disposition location. The ﬁrst
analysis consists of patients who were discharged from the
ED directly to home, and the second analysis consists of
patients who were admitted as inpatients to the hospital
from the ED.
Aggregated monthly hospital level ED length of stay
time data are used with permission of the BC Ministry
of Health, while ethics approval was obtained from the
Behavioural Research Ethics Board at the University of
British Columbia.
3. Results
The number of ED visits during each ﬁscal year in the
ED P4P participating-hospitals from April 2009 to March
2012 is summarized in Table 2. Overall, the trend in the
number of ED visits is increasing over time in BC’s hospi-
tals. The increases are approximately uniform across acuity
levels (CTAS levels). The absolute number of visits is trend-
ing upwards in all four VCHA hospitals in the program,
with the possible exception of Richmond hospital, which is
constant. In contrast, the four hospitals in FHA have expe-
rienced mixed changes in volume. Unlike Burnaby General
and Royal Columbian hospitals that have experienced sta-
ble number of ED visits over the two years, Surrey Memorialth Policy 113 (2013) 86– 92 89
and Abbotsford General have experienced steady increases
in ED visits over time.
4. ED LOS
For patients who  were discharged directly from the ED
to home, we  analyzed the rate at which patients’ ED LOS
met  the ED LOS time thresholds. The results of the multi-
variate analysis shown in Table 3 indicate that, for VCHA,
despite increasing volumes of ED visits, hospitals main-
tained the rate over time at which patients met  the ED
LOS time thresholds (p = 0.57). That is, since the regression
parameter is not statistically signiﬁcant, over time and on
average, ED LOS times have been held constant in VCHA’s
hospitals. In contrast, for FHA, there was a decrease over
time in the rate at which hospital’s patients met  the ED
LOS time thresholds (p < 0.01).
At the onset of the funding initiative in ﬁscal year
2009–2010, the highest rate of ED visits meeting the ED
LOS time threshold was Burnaby General Hospital, fol-
lowed closely by St. Paul’s Hospital. However, the ﬁndings
for more recent periods diverge; while St. Paul’s slightly
improved its rate of ED visits meeting the ED LOS time tar-
get, Burnaby General’s expected rate has declined, a change
in divergence of 3%, or approximately 180 patients per
period meeting the time threshold (based on the monthly
volume of 6000 visits).
Over the study period, Abbotsford Regional Hospital’s
rate of meeting the ED LOS time threshold steadily declined
to be the lowest among the study hospitals, such that at the
last ﬁscal period analyzed (2011–2012), only 49% of these
patients’ ED LOS time was less than the threshold required
for ED P4P funding, as compared to 66% at both Burnaby
and St. Paul’s.
The multivariate ﬁndings also reveal that the number
of hospital beds was  negatively related to attaining the ED
LOS time threshold (p < 0.01), though the parameter esti-
mate of −0.01 suggests this effect is clinically irrelevant.
Also, teaching hospitals were signiﬁcantly more likely to
attain the ED LOS threshold than non-teaching hospitals
(p < 0.01).
In the second analysis, the rate at which patients admit-
ted as inpatients to the hospital from the ED within the
10-h ED LOS time threshold was  analyzed. There was a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant decrease in the rate over time at which
FHA’s hospitals admitted patients from the ED within the
10-h ED LOS time threshold (p = 0.02). As shown in Table 4,
over the study period among FHA hospitals, there was a
wide split in hospitals’ performance. Abbottsford Regional
has shown considerably lower rates in admitting patients
from the ED within the 10-h threshold in comparison to the
other FHA hospitals.
In contrast, the rate at which hospitals admitted
patients from the ED within the 10-h ED LOS time thresh-
old in VCHA’s hospitals has improved over the study period
(p < 0.01). As shown in Table 4 within VCHA, St. Paul’s Hos-
pital was most likely to admit ED visits to hospital within
the 10-h threshold, closely followed by Vancouver General.
The analysis of ED LOS among patients admitted from
the ED also reveals that the number of hospital beds was
unrelated to attaining the ED LOS time threshold (p = 0.15).
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Table 2
Number of ED visits of health authorities’ hospitals participating in the BC’s ED P4P program.
BC Health Authority (Year joining the ED P4P) Hospital Fiscal year visits
2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012
Fraser (2008) 269,794 283,430 294,823
Abbotsford Regional 53,320 57,497 61,571
Burnaby General 69,642 69,797 72,354
Royal Columbian 60,724 63,815 63,797
Surrey Memorial 86,108 92,321 97,101
Vancouver Coastal (2007) 233,739 239,031 252,982
Vancouver General 75,451 76,270 81,061
Richmond 45,361 43,737 45,614
Lions Gate 49,260 51,492 53,547
St. Paul’s 63,667 67,532 72,760
Table 3
Summary of the multivariate regression model (for time series data) of the rate of ED visits that attain the ED length of stay time thresholds, adjusting for
Health  Authority and time trend.
Health Authority Hospital Adjusted rate – mid-point of ﬁscal year (%)
2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012
Fraser (FHA)
Abbotsford Regional (FHA) 51 50 49
Burnaby General (FHA) 68 67 66
Royal Columbian (FHA) 61 60 59
Surrey Memorial (FHA) 61 60 58
Lion’s Gate (VCHA) 60 60 61
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. Discussion
The BC government, and later the BC HSPO, expected
hat incremental funding for hospitals would decrease ED
ait times and ED LOS if the policies were effective. The
agnitude of the additional funding was such that during
he ﬁscal year 2011–2012, approximately $13 million was
aid out to FHA and VCHA for hospitals that participated
n the ED P4P program, or on average, approximately $1.5
illion per participating hospital.
While the premise of P4P programs is to provide ﬁnan-
ial incentives for health care professionals to improve
atient outcomes, multiple reviews have cautioned against
he use of time-based outcome measurement, since P4P
able 4
ummary of multivariate regression model (for time series data) of the rate of E
dmitted, adjusting for Health Authority and time trend.
Health Authority Hospital 
Fraser (FHA)
Abbotsford Regional (FHA) 
Burnaby General (FHA) 
Royal Columbian (FHA) 
Surrey Memorial (FHA) 
Vancouver Coastal
(VCHA)
Lion’s Gate (VCHA) 
Richmond (VCHA) 
St.  Paul’s (VCHA) 
Vancouver General (VCHA) 62 63 63
65 66 66
52 52 52
programs that reward practitioners for working within
a speciﬁc time have generally been ineffective [24]. At
the same time, a review of P4Ps has found that more
positive outcomes are achieved when ﬁnancial incen-
tives are provided to individual practitioners and health
care teams rather than to a hospital or health system
[25]. However, the relevance of the literature linking P4P
to these hospital-based ﬁndings is questioned since BC’s
ED P4P does not remunerate individual clinicians, but
rather Health Authorities that then direct the funds to
the hospitals. Consequently, this analysis contributes new
information relevant to single payer healthcare systems
used in many European countries.
The ﬁndings regarding BC’s hospitals’ response to the
ED P4P program are mixed for the government. VCHA’s
hospitals that participated in the ED P4P program are main-
taining or improving their rates of patients meeting the ED
LOS time thresholds in spite of more visits to their EDs. In
D visits that attain the 10 h wait time threshold among patients that are
Adjusted rate – mid-point of ﬁscal year (%)
2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012
42 39 36
53 49 45
52 48 44
51 48 44
51 52 52
52 52 52
61 62 62
58 58 59
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the ﬁrst analysis of ED LOS, VCHA’s hospitals maintained
their rate (p = 0.57) of non-admitted patients meeting the
ED LOS time threshold, while the second analysis revealed
VCHA’s hospitals experienced an improvement (p < 0.01)
in rates of admitted patients meeting the 10 h threshold.
VCHA’s ability to decrease ED LOS times point to some hos-
pital successes, which should be further studied.
In contrast, FHA’s hospitals are moving in the opposite
direction, with poorer ED LOS time results over time. In
other words, in FHA hospitals, non-admitted patients have
been waiting longer in more recent times (p < 0.01). In addi-
tion, the decrease in the rate of patients being admitted
within 10 h is declining in FHA hospitals (p < 0.01).
As an artifact of how BC’s ED P4P program was
constructed, neither the BC HSPO nor the provincial gov-
ernment prescribes how each hospital is expected to
achieve the target ED LOS; thus, each hospital is left to
develop its’ own initiatives to meet the ED length of stay
time targets. There is no formal data collection by the BC
HSPO on the P4P implementation context or uptake of the
program that enables the evaluation of the process to take
place. Consequently, this analysis of ED LOS time threshold
data sheds little light on the operational programs or meth-
ods hospitals have used to attract new revenue through
the ED P4P program. Future evaluations of this incentive
program would beneﬁt from a qualitative review of contex-
tual factors affecting hospital’s responses in order to create
generalizable knowledge.
Nonetheless, for the BC HSPO, tasked with creating
incentives for reducing ED wait and ED LOS, the results
provide feedback that the ﬁnancial incentives are poten-
tially not working as intended to reduce ED wait and
ED LOS across all hospitals, particularly those in FHA.
On this point, the literature provides few clues regarding
the appropriate amount of the ﬁnancial incentive nec-
essary to induce hospitals to respond to the incentives
[26].
Relative to amounts described in other studies, it is
unclear whether the ﬁnancial incentives provided by the
BC HSPO are sufﬁcient for hospitals to pursue long-term
changes in staff, equipment or resources; especially consid-
ering that, relative to hospital’s budgets, the incentive
amounts of the ED P4P program are very modest, less than
1% of hospital’s budgets. Given the small magnitude of
the incentive, one may  question whether a larger incen-
tive and longer commitment to the ED P4P program by
the BC government and BC HSPO was a necessary condi-
tion for hospitals to invest in more resource-demanding
projects, such as re-designing physical capacity or infra-
structure that would improve ED access and decrease ED
LOS times.
Evidence regarding the relationship between the size of
an incentive and effectiveness is unclear; a recent study
demonstrated that a higher amount of ﬁnancial incentive
(4% of hospital budget) may  be associated with a successful
0.9% reduction in mortality in England of a hospital-based
P4P program [27]. The same P4P program, when imple-
mented in the US, with a reduced incentive amount of 2%
of the hospital budget, was not associated with a mortal-
ity reduction [27]. However, these ﬁndings derived from
a hospital-based P4P program based on patient outcomesth Policy 113 (2013) 86– 92 91
may  not be generalized to the ED setting in which the BC
ED P4P program is based.
Others have demonstrated that changes in cost-sharing
between the hospital and the emergency department,
decision making and ﬁnancial transparency, departmental
decision making autonomy, and high level of health care
worker commitment and sense of belonging all contribute
to improving productivity [28,29]. More speciﬁcally, the
most recent literature of a successful P4P program suggests
that a high ﬁnancial incentive, regular meetings between
hospitals to share lessons learned, and mandatory partic-
ipation in the P4P program may  be key factors for the
program’s success [27]. However, due to its design, the cur-
rent study on the BC ED P4P program does not provide
details regarding each hospital’s management of the pro-
gram and is unable to address questions regarding some
of the aspects associated with successful P4P program,
such as regular meetings between hospitals or whether
the monthly P4P funding data was shared by the admin-
istrators with the ED health workers. This gap possibly
undermined the potential motivation and feedback that
these results can have on the staff who are able to make
a difference on a patient’s ED LOS and clinical outcome.
The mixed ﬁndings in the current study should give
government pause; does the ED P4P program improve
access, or is it simply another mechanism to transfer unres-
tricted operating funds to hospitals? Weaknesses in the
data leave policy-makers wondering how the ED length
of stay times would have fared without the additional
attention, data collection and staffs’ focus on lengths of
waits that the ED P4P program provided. Reporting on
additional outcomes, such as patient-reported satisfaction
or cost per ED visit, would have supported a more com-
prehensive evaluation of the program. Nonetheless, if the
program continues beyond its three-year mandate that
ends in 2013, additional hospitals and longer time periods
will provide additional feedback on the funding policies in
future years. Either way, as other provinces and countries
consider strategies to improve access to congested EDs, the
results of the targeting spending on ED P4P in BC will be
closely watched.
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